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This thematic section of Biological Theory is focused on
development; it raises the problem of the temporal and
spatial boundaries of development. From a temporal point
of view, when does development start and stop? From a
spatial point of view, what is it exactly that ‘‘develops,’’
and is it possible to delineate clearly the developing entity?
This section explores the possible answers to these ques-
tions, and thus sheds light on the definition of development
itself.
According to the traditional view, development refers to
the process through which a fertilized egg gives rise to an
adult organism. This traditional definition offers an
immediate answer to the problem examined here, that of
the temporal and spatial boundaries of development.
Temporally, development starts with fertilization and ends
at adulthood—usually defined as the stage at which the
reproductive capacity has been acquired. Spatially, what
develops is an organism, seen as the product of internal,
preexisting capacities found in the egg.
However, this traditional definition and, as a conse-
quence, this traditional conception of the boundaries of
development have recently been put into question. As far
as the temporal aspects are concerned, it has recently been
suggested that development, far from being accomplished
at adulthood, lasts all life. Major proponents of this thesis
are Gilbert (2002, 2010, 2011), Minelli (2003, 2011),
‘‘developmental systems’’ theorists (Oyama 2000 [1985];
Oyama et al. 2001; Griffiths 2009), and biologists inves-
tigating the notion of phenotypic plasticity, first and fore-
most West-Eberhard (2003).
Concerning the spatial aspects, several biologists and
philosophers insist on the necessity of taking into account
the crucial influence of the environment on development.
They consider that contemporary developmental biology
has been excessively ‘‘internalist’’ or even ‘‘preformation-
ist,’’ i.e., too much focused on the idea that the organism
would be the product of the unfolding of internal potenti-
alities (Oyama 2000 [1985]; Oyama et al. 2001; Lewontin
2000; see also Minelli 2011). Recently, the emerging field
of ecological developmental biology (‘‘EcoDevo’’) has
presented new data and new arguments in favor of
integrating the role of the environment in development
(Gilbert and Epel 2009; see also Gilbert 2002; McFall-Ngai
2002). Together, these biologists and philosophers consider
that the spatial boundaries of the developing entity are
blurred and need to be redefined, and more generally that
we are to modify our conception of what a biological
individual is (e.g., Gilbert 2002). Some even hold that the
developing entity is, in fact, a system made of the organism
plus its environment [e.g., some proponents of develop-
mental systems theory or DST, in particular Griffiths and
Gray (2001)]. Yet does insisting on the influence of the
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environment on development amount to claiming that the
environment is part of the entity that develops? In this
section, we explore the way in which the environment
impinges on development, and the consequences of this
idea for the delineation of the developing entity.
Of the nine articles that constitute this special section,
seven deal with the temporal boundaries of development
(Gilbert, Laplane, Minelli, Morange, Nicoglou, Thery, and
Vervoort), and two with its spatial boundaries (Maienschein
and Pradeu; but note that Minelli also examines some
spatial aspects of development). Our intention has been to
use specific conceptual tools to try to shed light on the
definition of the boundaries of development: mechanisms of
genetic regulation, in particular Hox and MicroRNAs
(The´ry); regeneration (Minelli, Vervoort); metamorphosis
(Minelli); stem cells (Laplane); phenotypic plasticity
(Nicoglou); aging (Morange); and symbiosis (Pradeu).
Our conviction has been that the debate over the
boundaries of development is to a large extent due to a
lack of precise definition of the notions involved, in
particular, naturally, the notion of ‘‘development’’ itself.
To take a telling example, when philosophers and biolo-
gists say that development continues throughout a life,
what do they call ‘‘development’’? Most often, they seem
to understand development as the construction of an ever-
changing organism, but then it is almost by definition that
development can be said to last until the death of the
organism. The common view they reject does not say that
the organism stops changing at maturity, but rather that
there is something specific to the early stages of the
construction of an organism. Part of the problem, there-
fore, comes from the fact that the two opposing sides are
not really answering each other. What the proponents of
the critical thesis need, therefore, are good arguments to
reject the common view that there is something specific to
these early stages of an organism’s construction. Thus,
several of the articles in this section (in particular
Laplane, Morange, Nicoglou, The´ry, Vervoort) try to
articulate a precise definition of development thanks to a
periodization of the construction of an organism, made
possible by a focus on specific mechanisms or processes
(e.g., genetic regulation, regeneration, metamorphosis,
involvement of stem cells, phenotypic plasticity, aging,
etc.) Several of them conclude that it is, on the whole, not
satisfying to claim that development lasts all life (La-
plane, Morange, Nicoglou, The´ry, Vervoort), while three
articles defend the opposite view (Gilbert, Maienschein,
Minelli); but all these answers are anchored in a precise
analysis of specific developmental processes. Another
possible strategy is to argue that ‘‘development’’ is too
equivocal a concept, and therefore needs to be replaced
by a series of well-defined terms, such as cleavage, gas-
trulation, and organogenesis (Pradeu), or else that the
referent of the word ‘‘development’’ needs to be specified
(Laplane).
Let us now quickly present the articles. Alessandro
Minelli claims that no comprehensive theory of develop-
ment is available yet. He shows the tension between the
traditional view of development and processes like meta-
morphosis or metagenesis, which possess some character-
istic features of development. He suggests that a
comprehensive theory of development should start with a
zero principle of ‘‘developmental inertia,’’ corresponding
to an indeterminate local self-perpetuation of cell-level
dynamics, and illustrates this principle through the analysis
of numerous examples.
Fre´de´rique The´ry, considering the possibility of defining
animal development through genetic regulatory mecha-
nisms, argues that development is characterized by
sequential and irreversible changes in gene expression,
taking place throughout the organism. This definition
implies that at least in some animal species development is
not a lifelong process.
Michel Vervoort reports the existence of regeneration-
specific processes, and the fact that seemingly similar
processes acting during development and regeneration may
have differential molecular and cellular bases. He therefore
concludes that there are significant differences between
regeneration processes in adult animals and developmental
processes occurring during earlier phases of the life cycle,
precluding the use of the existence of regenerative capa-
bilities in adult animals as an argument in favor of devel-
opment spanning the whole life.
Antonine Nicoglou gives an account of the different
uses of the concept of plasticity and shows that the dis-
tinctions between the uses have consequences for the
temporal boundaries assigned to development. She pro-
poses a definition of plasticity, as a feature of morpho-
logical processes, and offers a way forward for exploring
the temporal boundaries of development.
Lucie Laplane develops a species-dependent account of
the temporality of development using stem cells as a tool.
She distinguishes four different types of temporal bound-
aries of development depending on species developmental
abilities.
Michel Morange describes the recent accumulation of
results concerning the ‘‘mechanisms of aging.’’ Although
aging is related to development, mechanisms of aging are
obviously not related to the mechanisms of development.
To the contrary, they have characteristics that distinguish
them from those of development.
Scott Gilbert explores a phenomenon that has recently
led to a temporal expansion of developmental biology into
adulthood, namely the production of adult-onset pheno-
types by exposure of the fetus or neonate to environmen-
tal agents, including maternal nutrients, developmental
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modulators (endocrine disruptors), and maternal care. He
suggests that this brings a new, under-appreciated, layer of
gene regulation into developmental biology, and demon-
strates the poverty of the nature versus nurture framework
for discussing phenotype production.
Jane Maienschein asks about the boundary definition of
the developing organism: What is an individual organism,
and what defines it as the same organism as it changes over
time? Through an examination of key concepts such as
‘‘organization’’ and of key actors such as Roux, Driesch,
and E.B. Wilson, she offers a detailed account of how this
question of the boundaries of the developing organism has
been answered historically.
Thomas Pradeu shows that, contrary to the internalist
view, the development of an organism in almost all cases
implies the presence of ‘‘foreign’’ entities, in particular
symbiotic bacteria. He claims that the developing entity is
therefore a heterogeneous organism, the spatial boundaries
of which can be delineated quite clearly through its
immune system.
This series of articles will hopefully confirm that philos-
ophy of developmental biology is an active, deeply con-
ceptual, field—and not only within the much discussed
domain of EvoDevo. Determining what development is and
what its boundaries are can shed light on key concepts such
as individuality, organization, metabolism, and homeostasis.
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